Abstract. Distance-Bounding is used to defeat relay attacks. For wireless payment systems, the payment terminal is not always online. So, the protocol must rely on a public key for the prover (payer). We propose a generic transformation of a (weakly secure) symmetric distance bounding protocol which has no postverification into wide-strong-private and secure public-key distance bounding.
Introduction
Several wireless payment systems such as toll payment systems and NFC credit cards have recently been spread. These methods allow to pay small amounts without any action from the holder (no confirmation, no PIN code) other than approaching their device to the payment terminal.
In relay attacks, a man-in-the-middle A passively relays messages between two participants: a prover P and a verifier V [9, 10] . The prover P is a credit card (of the payer) and the verifier V is a payment terminal (of the vendor). A can be run by two players: a malicious customer A 1 mimicking a payment in a shop to buy some service to V , and a malicious neighbor A 2 to the victim P. A 1 and A 2 relay messages between P and V . The payer may remain clueless.
So far, the most promising technique to defeat relay attacks is distance-bounding (DB) [5] . A DB protocol has several fast challenge/response rounds during which the verifier/vendor sends a challenge bit and expects to receive a response bit within a very short time from the prover/payer. The protocol fails if some response arrives too late or is incorrect. Due to the time of flight, if P is too far from V , his time to compute the response is already over when the challenge reaches him. Here are the traditional threat models for DB.
-Honest-prover security: man-in-the-middle attacks (MiM) (including impersonation fraud [1] and the so-called mafia fraud [8] including relay attacks). -Malicious-prover security: distance fraud (DF) [5] , in which a far-away malicious prover pretends that he is close; distance hijacking (DH) [7] , in which the malicious prover relies on honest close-by participants; collusion frauds (CF) [3] (including the so-called terrorist fraud [8] ), in which a malicious prover colludes with closeby participants (but without leaking credentials).
-Privacy, where we want that no man-in-the-middle adversary can learn the identity of the prover. Wide/narrow privacy refers to whether the adversary can see if a protocol succeeds on the verifier side. Strong/weak privacy refers to whether the adversary can corrupt provers and get their secret.
For payment systems, we cannot assume an online connection to a trusted server nor a shared secret between the payer and the vendor: we must have a public-key based protocol. We can further wonder which threat models are relevant. Clearly, the manin-the-middle attacks are the main concern. Privacy is also important as payers want to remain anonymous to observers. For undeniability, a malicious payer shall not do a distance fraud then deny having made a payment on the basis that he was too far. Distance fraud shall also be prevented to be able to catch red handed people who pay with a stolen credit card. insecure insecure insecure insecure HPO [13] secure secure insecure secure insecure GOR [11] secure secure insecure insecure insecure insecure ProProx [18] secure secure secure secure insecure insecure privDB secure secure secure insecure secure secure (Missing entries correspond to absence of proof in either direction.) Not many public-key DB protocols exist: the Brands-Chaum protocol [5] , the DBPK-Log protocol [6] , the protocol by Hermans, Peeters, and Onete [13] (herein called the HPO protocol), its recent extension by Gambs, Onete, and Robert [11] (the GOR protocol, herein) 1 , and ProProx [18] (see Table 1 ). None except ProProx resist to collusion frauds. The Brands-Chaum protocol does not resist to distance hijacking [7] . In [2] , Bay et al. have broken DBPK-Log. Neither the Brands-Chaum protocol nor ProProx protect privacy but the HPO and GOR protocols were designed for this. However, HPO does not offer strong privacy and privacy in GOR can be broken, as this will be proven in a subsequent paper.
In this paper, we transform a symmetric DB protocol symDB with no post-verification into a public-key DB protocol privDB. Assuming some weak form of DF, MiM, and DH security for symDB, we prove that privDB is DF, MiM, DH secure, and strong-private. It is the first to be provably DH-secure and the first to be strong private. We propose a suitable symDB protocol called OTDB.
Definitions
We recall and adapt the framework of [4, 18] . We assume a multiparty setting in which participants have a location and information travels at the speed of light. Participants receive inputs and produce outputs. Honest participants run their purported algorithm. Malicious participants may run an arbitrary probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm. The definition below is adapted from [4, 18] to accommodate identification protocols and also to bridge public-key and symmetric distance bounding. 
The protocol must be complete. I.e., such that "setting up the keys" for (P,V ) then making P(sk P , pk V ) and V (sk V ) interact together, at locations within a distance up to B always makes V (sk V ) accept (Out V = 1) and output pk P .
Moving to noisy settings [16] follows standard techniques which are omitted herein. Verifiers are assumed to be able to validate pk P (e.g., by means of a PKI). In what follows, Validate(pk P ) denotes this operation.
Security of DB. Like in [4, 18] , all security notions are formalized by a game with three types of participants: provers, verifiers, and actors. Each participant can have several instances at different location or time. Without loss of generality, actors are malicious. The purported algorithm is P for provers and V for verifiers. There is a distinguished instance of the verifier denoted by V . Instances of participants within a distance to V up to B are called close-by. Others are called far-away. We say that the adversary wins if V accepts. In security models, we only consider without loss of generality (several instances of) one verifier who is honest. In Def. 2-3, we consider without loss of generality (several instances of) one prover with an identity corresponding to the key pk P .
Definition 2 ([18]). We consider the following honest-prover security notion. At the beginning of the game, we set up the keys (following Def. 1) and give pk V as input to all participants, sk P as input to the prover instances, and pk P as input to all malicious participants. The prover is honest. The DB protocol is MiM-secure (man-in-the-middle)
if for all such settings in which there is no close-by prover, the probability that V accepts and outputs pk P is negligible. 2 The DB protocol is one-time Note that the key of the malicious prover is set up maliciously (even depending on pk V ) using an algorithm K which can differ from K P .
Privacy. The most general and prominent model for privacy is the simulation-based privacy notion in [17] which was enriched in [15] . Hermans et al. [14] presented a simpler privacy model which we call the HPVP model. [14] Distance Hijacking. In distance hijacking [7] , the prover is malicious, running an algorithm A and we add a honest prover P(sk P ′ , pk V ) with another identity P ′ associated to pk P ′ . The malicious prover runs A(sk P , pk P , pk P ′ , pk V ). We formalize distance hijacking for DB protocols consisting of a regular (i.e., time-insensitive) initialization phase, a time-critical challenge phase, and a regular verification phase. A is playing a man-inthe-middle between P(sk P ′ , pk V ) and V (sk V ) except during the challenge phase when he remains passive. (See Fig. 1. )
Definition 4 (HPVP Privacy
and A, the following game makes V output pk P with negligible probability: 1: for public-key DB:
if pk P = pk P ′ , the game aborts for symmetric DB: We propose a one-time DB protocol OTDB based on the Hancke-Kuhn protocol [12] . It is represented on Fig. 2 . We use a 2n-bit secret s. It is XORed to a random mask m selected by the verifier. The answer to a challenge in iteration i is just the bit of s ⊕ m at position 2i − 1 or 2i, depending on the challenge. We define a sub-category of simple DB protocols. 
. The canonical point is that there is no interactive verification and the secret is used by P only in the challenge phase and by V only in the final verification. Proof. The canonical structure of OTDB is clear.
For DF-security, we observe that whatever the adversary is doing, the distribution of a on the verifier side is uniform in {0, 1} 2n . Since there is no close-by participant, a response can be received on time only if it was sent before the challenge was known. If a 2i−1 = a 2i , this can be done with probability 1. Otherwise, this can only be done with probability 1 2 . So, the optimal probability that all responses are correct is ∑ n w=0
) n which is negligible.
For OT-MiM-security, we consider a distant V = V (s) and P(s) with several actors.
By playing with P(s), the adversary can deduce for each i either s 2i−1 or s 2i but not both. To answer to V , he must know precisely which of these two bits is needed but when he learns it, it is too late to play with P(s) to get it. So, the probability to pass one round is limited to 3 4 . So, the probability of success is also
) n , which is negligible.
For OT-DH-security, we consider P ′ who is set up with a random s ′ and V who is maliciously set up with an independent s. In the initialization part (which can be corrupted), we let m be the value sent by V and m ′ be the value received by P ′ . When they start the challenge phase, V uses a = s ⊕ m and P ′ uses a ′ = s ′ ⊕ m ′ , where m ′ only depends on m and s. So, a ′ is uniformly distributed and independent from a. The challenge part between P ′ and V cannot be corrupted, by definition of the OT-DHsecurity. Hence, V accepts with probability 2 −n , which is negligible.
⊓ ⊔
As concrete parameters, we can use n = 49 for a 2 −20 online security.
The privDB Protocol
We adapt the RFID protocol from [15, 17] for DB. We assume that K V generates a key pair for a public-key cryptosystem Enc/Dec and that K P generates a key pair for a digital signature scheme Sign/Verify. The protocol runs as follows (see Fig. 3 ): 1. V sends a nonce N to P; 2. P picks a random s and sends Enc pk V (s∥pk P ∥Sign sk P (N)) to V ; 3. V decrypts, verifies the signature on N, and validates pk P (if this step fails, V sends Out V = 0 and aborts); 3 4 . P and V run a symmetric DB symDB based on the secret s (if this step fails, V sends Out V = 0 and aborts); 5. the private output of V is set to pk P and the public one is set to Out V = 1. Compared to HPO [13] , the encrypted channel can also be used to transmit a certificate in a private way.
Verifier Prover secret key: sk V secret key: sk P public key: pk V public key: 
Theorem 8. If symDB is DF-secure then privDB is DF-secure.
The reduction is quite trivial. Clearly, the standard UF-CMA security implies S-UF-1CMA security. Proof. We let Γ 0 denote the MiM security game. In what follows, Γ i is a game and p i denotes the probability that Γ i succeeds. We want to show that p 0 is negligible. We first reduce Γ 0 to a game Γ 1 in which no two verifiers select the same nonce and no two provers select the same s (so, their e are unique as well). Clearly, p 1 − p 0 is negligible. In Γ 2 , we simulate every verifier V who is given a e produced by a prover P. We let N, s, pk P , σ be the values from the viewpoint of P. In the simulation, if V produced N himself, the decryption and verifications are skipped and V proceeds with symDB(s) directly. We say that P and V are matching instances. Otherwise, only the decryption is skipped and V proceeds with s, pk P , σ. Clearly, p 2 = p 1 . In Γ 2 , no e produced by any P needs to be decrypted. In Γ 3 , we sequentially replace every e = Enc pk V (s, pk P , σ) by some e = Enc pk V (rand) and use the IND-CCA security to deduce that p 3 − p 2 is negligible. In Γ 3 , no information about s or σ leaks from e. To go from Γ 3 to Γ 4 , we eliminate all signatures by repeating the following transformation: let σ = Sign sk P (N) be the very first signature computation. We note that σ can only be used later by a Verify pk P (σ, N ′ ) computation, for N ̸ = N ′ . If it is not immediately followed by a this verification, we postpone the signature computation to the very first moment when σ is used. Clearly, this does not affect the probability of success. If instead it is followed by Verify pk P (σ, N ′ ), we replace Verify pk P (σ, N ′ ) by 0 (rejection). (So, the next transformation continues to postpone the signature.) By replacing the generation of a random N ′ by a S-UF-1CMA challenge (and aborting if it is not the right N ′ ), we use the S-UF-1CMA security to deduce that the probability of success is negligibly affected. After repeating this process, we eliminate the signing operations. We obtain a game Γ 4 in which a verifier instance has up to one matching prover instance and each prover instance has up to one matching verifier instance.
In Γ 4 , either V uses a forged signature (but we eliminate this case with the S-UF-1CMA security), or V has a unique matching P and they both run symDB(s) on a random s. By simulating everything else but this instance of symDB, we obtain the OTMiM-security game of symDB. Due to the OT-MiM-security of symDB, we conclude that p 4 must be negligible.
⊓ ⊔ Proof. We let Γ 0 denote the DH security game. In what follows, Γ i is a game and p i denotes the probability that Γ i succeeds. We want to show that p 0 is negligible. Since symDB has no interactive verification, Γ 0 consists of two phases after the key set up: the initialization phase and the challenge phase. The last phase matches the challenge phase of symDB between V and P ′ alone. For Γ 0 to succeed, V must identify P. So, we assume that V receives pk P during the initialization. The main point is to realize that V and P ′ must then start with two independent keys s and s ′ with s ′ uniform. We conclude using the OT-DH-security of symDB. We do the same reduction as in the proof of Th. 10 to the games Γ 1 , Γ 2 , Γ 3 , Γ 4 (with P ′ replacing P). Since V receives pk P , he cannot match P ′ . Let s ′ be the randomly distributed value selected by P ′ . We first treat the case where there is no V i matching P ′ . So, s ′ is never used before the challenge phase due to the canonical structure of symDB.
Therefore, V is set up with some s which is independent from s ′ . Hence, we are in the situation of the OT-DH game of symDB. By using the OT-DH-security of symDB, p 3 is negligible. Let now assume that one verifier instance matches P ′ . We know that it is unique and we assume that it is V 1 without loss of generality. If V 1 does not compute his Out V 1 before the challenge phase of the game, none of his messages depend on s ′ due to the canonical structure of symDB, so we can proceed as in the previous case. Now, if V 1 sends out his Out V 1 before the challenge phase of the game, we define a new game Γ 5 in which Out V 1 is replaced by 0. In Γ 5 , we can conclude as in the previous case that p 5 is negligible. So, what is left to be shown is that p 5 − p 4 is negligible, or equivalently that Out V 1 = 1 with negligible probability in Γ 4 . For that, we observe that P ′ is only running the initialization of symDB (which does not depend on s ′ by assumption on symDB) until Out V 1 is released. Since V 1 is set up with a random s ′ and that no other algorithm depends on s ′ in this phase, we are in an impersonation attack case. We conclude using the OT-MiM security of symDB.
⊓ ⊔ Proof. We let Γ 0 denote the wide-strong HPVP privacy game. In what follows, Γ i is a game and p i denotes the probability that Γ i succeeds. We want to show that p 0 − 1 2 is negligible. We do the same reduction as in the proof of Th. 10 to the games Γ 1 , Γ 2 , Γ 3 , Γ 4 (but with KK-UF-1CMA security) and obtain that p 4 − p 0 is negligible. We observe that in Γ 4 , the pk P and σ by a drawn prover is never used. The public key is only important during Corrupt queries, but this does not apply on drawn provers in the HPVP model. So, drawn provers use no proper identity in Γ 4 . It does not matter which prover is drawn (the left or the right), the simulation of the prover is the same. So the probability of correctly winning β = b must be exactly p 4 = ⊓ ⊔
